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I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has inaugurated a new era in international
politics. The familiar terrain of the last half century has given way to a
world that is, in many ways, more complex and turbulent. Regional
conflicts, civil wars, ethnic strife, genocide, and humanitarian emergen-
cies have exploded across the globe. As crises such as those in Bosnia,
Somalia, and Haiti have unfolded, the international community increas-
ingly has looked to the United States-as the last remaining super-
power-to provide leadership and resources in a broad array of conflict
situations.
The United States, in turn, increasingly has chosen to use its role on
the United Nations Security Council to help chart collective responses to
these crises. No longer paralyzed by Cold War tensions, the fifteen-
member U.N. Security Council' has authorized collective military action
in a number of recent cases.2 Although American forces frequently have
* Copyright © 1996, Jane E. Stromseth, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. I am grateful to Polly Minifie, Amy Paye, David Balch, and Doug Leeds
for their research assistance; and to my husband, James Schear, for his comments and
encouragement.
1. The Security Council consists of five permanent members with veto power (the United
States, Russia, France, Britain, and China), as well as 10 nonpermanent members who serve on a
rotating basis. U.N. CHARTER, art. 23.
2. Examples include the collective response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the collective
humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and the Haiti operation. In other cases, however, member
states have been reluctant to authorize or take decisive military action in the face of bitter ethnic
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played the predominant role in these operations, the United States has
found multilateral action to be a useful means of mobilizing resources,
building consensus, and sharing the risks and costs of responding to
international conflicts of various sorts.
The Security Council's repertoire of possible responses to threats to
international peace and security is considerable. Under Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, for example, the Security Council can
authorize collective military action on a major scale, as it did in response
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and North Korea's invasion of
South Korea in 1950.1 In both cases, a powerful coalition of forces, led
by the United States, went to battle against a substantial adversary.
At the other end of the military spectrum, the Security Council can
authorize "peacekeeping" operations, in which unarmed or lightly armed
forces are deployed with the consent of the parties to a conflict in order
to perform tasks such as monitoring ceasefires, observing the demobili-
zation of opposing forces, and safeguarding local stability to allow elec-
tions. While their responsibilities may vary, peacekeeping forces
generally only use minimum force in self-defense, and then only as a
last resort.4
In response to a number of ethnic conflicts and humanitarian emer-
gencies in recent years, the Security Council has authorized military
operations that fall somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and
major combat operations. In these so-called "peace enforcement" opera-
tions, the Council has used its Chapter VII powers to authorize the use
of force for certain limited purposes. In the case of Somalia, for exam-
ple, the Council authorized a coalition of predominantly American
forces to use "all necessary means to establish ... a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations."' In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the Council authorized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
conflicts, and the Security Council instead has authorized more limited operations, as, for
example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Rwanda. In still other desperate cases, the Security
Council has taken no action at all.
3. In both Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States committed the preponderance of
forces and exercised overall command. Whether these operations are best viewed as United
Nations "enforcement actions" or as collective self-defense actions endorsed by the Security
Council is a subject of some dispute. For a discussion of this issue, see Eugene V. Rostow,
Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, Continued: Until What?
Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense, 85 Am. J. INr'L L. 506 (1991); Oscar Schachter,
United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 457-63 (1991); Jane E.
Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United Nations, 81 GEo.
L.J. 597, nn. 137, 266 (1993).
4. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING 6-7 (2d ed. 1990)[hereinafter, THE BLUE HELMETS].
5. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
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to use its air power to protect U.N.-designated safe areas from attack.6
Such Chapter VII operations may involve forcible action against hostile
parties in situations of ongoing conflict, but they generally stop short of
major enforcement operations designed to defeat an adversary on the
battlefield.
American armed forces have played a significant role in U.N.-
authorized military actions across the entire spectrum, from major com-
bat operations to consensual peacekeeping. With respect to Chapter VII
operations, however, only before the Persian Gulf War did the President
seek and obtain Congress's authorization before sending U.S. forces into
combat.7 In contrast, President Bush did not seek Congress's authoriza-
tion before sending American troops to Somalia in Operation Restore
Hope, nor did President Clinton obtain approval from Congress for sub-
sequent combat operations against the forces of General Mohamed
Aideed during the second phase of the Somalia operation. President
Clinton likewise did not seek congressional authorization before order-
ing U.S. combat forces to Haiti in a U.N.-approved operation to depose
the regime of General Raul Cedras and restore President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to power. Last-minute diplomacy fortunately transformed that
combat operation into a consensual one, but many members of Congress
remained angry that the President deliberately bypassed Congress.8 In
Bosnia, American air forces have participated in NATO air strikes
against Bosnian Serb military targets without express congressional
authorization. President Clinton subsequently asked for the support of
Congress before deploying U.S. troops to Bosnia to help enforce the
Dayton peace agreement, but he did not request or obtain Congress's
6. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc S/RES/836 (1993). More
precisely, this resolution authorized the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former
Yugoslavia "to deter attacks against the safe areas," id. 5, and "acting in self-defence, to take
the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe
areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them." Id. 9. In addition, the Security
Council in Resolution 836 decided that "Member states, acting nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject
to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures,
through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5
and 9 above." Id. 10.
7. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105
Stat. 3, 4 (1991). Although he obtained Congress's authorization, President Bush contended that
he had the constitutional authority to launch Operation Desert Storm without congressional
approval. For an analysis of the war powers disputes between the President and the Congress
during the Persian Gulf conflict, see Stromseth, supra note 3, at 640-55.
8. Carroll J. Doherty, President, Rebuffing Congress, Prepares to Launch Invasion, 52
CONG. Q. 2578, 2582-83 (1994).
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authorization.9
This pattern of cases raises difficult questions from the standpoint
of constitutional war powers. How should we understand the Constitu-
tion's allocation of war powers between Congress and the President as it
bears upon the commitment of U.S. forces to the diverse spectrum of
U.N.-authorized military operations? More concretely, by vesting in
Congress the power to "declare War,"10 does the Constitution require
Congress's approval before the President sends U.S. forces into hostili-
ties as peace "enforcers" under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, or as
"peacekeepers" deployed with the consent of all the parties to a conflict,
or in hybrid operations that involve elements of both consent and com-
pulsion? Or does U.N. Security Council authorization of force-pursu-
ant to the U.N. Charter treaty-empower the President as Commander
in Chief and as Chief Executive to commit American troops to U.N.
operations of various sorts? Answering these questions not only
involves interpreting the text of the Constitution and applying the foun-
ders' original purposes to a world very different from their own; it also
involves evaluating the constitutional significance of over 200 years of
historical practice and its meaning for U.N. military operations today."
In understanding the constitutional division of war powers between
Congress and the President in the U.N. context, John Hart Ely's book,
War and Responsibility,'2 provides a compelling starting point. In it,
Ely argues forcefully that the founders' reasons for giving Congress the
power to decide whether the country should go to war remain com-
pletely relevant today. The founders wanted to ensure that any decision
to declare or commence war reflected the concurrence of many people
of diverse viewpoints rather than the inclinations of the President
alone. 3 Their preference for legislative deliberation reflected a substan-
tive judgment that war, with all its accompanying risks and hardships,
should be difficult to commence. The founders also wanted the people's
direct representatives in the House of Representatives to be involved in
any decision to declare war. The people would bear the burden of com-
bat-their lives and resources would be put on the line. Furthermore,
their sustained support would be more likely if their representatives par-
9. Helen Dewar & Guy Gugliotta, Senate Backs Troops to Bosnia; House Fails to Block
Funding, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1995, at Al.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
11. This article is part of a larger, ongoing project in which I explore these questions in
greater depth and detail.
12. JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH (1993).
13. Id. at 3-4, 47.
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ticipated in the decision to go to war. 14 Although the President unilater-
ally could not commence war, as Commander in Chief the President was
empowered to conduct military operations authorized by Congress as
well as to "repel sudden attacks" in emergency situations that allowed
no time for advance congressional approval. 15 Ely argues persuasively
that developments since the Constitution's ratification have not rendered
the founders' animating purposes obsolete; nor has historical practice
amended the Constitution's requirement that Congress must authorize
wars before the country commences them. 16
Since the Korean War and for much of the Cold War period, how-
ever, the President and the Congress have subverted constitutional
requirements, Ely contends, in a self-interested "tacit deal" under which
the President "take[s] the responsibility" for sending U.S. troops into
hostilities "as long as he can make the decisions, and Congress . . .
live[s] with a lack of power as long as its members don't have to be held
accountable." 17 Under this arrangement, the President unilaterally has
committed American forces to combat on a number of occasions, while
Congress has reserved the right to "scold" the President after the fact if
things go wrong.I8 This "tacit deal" serves the institutional self-interests
of the President and the Congress: The President gains decision-making
flexibility in matters of war and peace, while the Congress avoids having
to make decisions about the use of force that are difficult and "politically
risky."'19 In the meantime, however, the American people are deprived
of a collective legislative judgment before their sons and daughters are
sent into combat.
War and Responsibility is a critical examination of how the United
States reaches, or rather fails to reach, collective national decisions
about putting American forces in harm's way. In this article, I examine
how collective international decisions regarding the use of force bear
upon our national constitutional processes in the post-Cold War era.
First, I discuss the central questions about the constitutional division of
war powers that have arisen in the U.N. context since the Charter was
ratified in 1945. Specifically, I analyze whether Security Council
approval of the use of military force affects the respective war powers of
Congress and the President. I also consider whether the concerns that
led the founders to give Congress the power to declare war still apply
14. Id. at 4-5.
15. Id. at 5-7.
16. Id. at 5-10 (rejecting the "counterargument from obsolescence" and the "counterargument
from practice").
17. Id. at 87-88.
18. Id. at 54.
19. Id. at 52-54.
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with the same force today when American troops participate in U.N.
military operations ranging from major enforcement action to consen-
sual peacekeeping. Next, I examine how the end of the Cold War
rivalry is affecting Congress's institutional incentives to assert a greater
role in decisions to commit American forces abroad. Focusing espe-
cially on the cases of Somalia and Haiti, I explore whether the "tacit
deal" that Ely criticizes so trenchantly is likely to continue when the
United States participates in U.N.-authorized military operations, or
whether we can expect a greater sharing of responsibility between Con-
gress and the President in the post-Cold War years ahead.
II. THE U.N. CHARTER FRAMEWORK AND CONSTITUTIONAL WAR
POWERS
The Senate in 1945 voted overwhelmingly to approve the United
Nations Charter.2" To most senators, a collective security arrangement
led by the United States and its World War II allies seemed very attrac-
tive.2' Both the Senate and the Truman Administration understood that
the Charter gave far-reaching power to the U.N. Security Council, on
which the United States would sit as a permanent member, with veto
power. Chapter VII, in particular, gave the Council broad authority to
determine whether "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression" existed, and to recommend or decide what action to take
in response.2 2 To ensure that the Security Council had forces at its dis-
posal to "use immediately and quickly in emergencies," 23 U.N. member
states agreed in Article 43 of the Charter to enter into "special agree-
ments" with the Council placing designated national forces "on call" for
the Council's use as the need arose.24 Recognizing that the Security
20. The vote was 89 to 2. 91 CONG. REc. 8190 (1945).
21. A critical factor in the Senate's support for the Charter was the strong partnership
between the President and the Congress in negotiating the Charter's provisions. Indeed, two
Senators (Democrat Tom Connally of Texas and Republican Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan) co-
chaired the U.S. negotiating delegation, and led a sustained, bipartisan effort to explain to their
colleagues why U.S. involvement in the United Nations was very much in the American interest.
For a discussion of the negotiations and legislative debates surrounding the United Nations
Charter, see Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74 (1991); see also The Constitutional Roles of Congress and the President in
Declaring and Waging War, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102nd Cong., 1 st Sess.
5-27 (1991) (report of David J. Scheffer, entitled "War Powers and the U.N. Charter") [hereinafter
War Powers Hearings]; Stromseth, supra note 3, at 601-14.
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. The Security Council could impose economic or diplomatic
sanctions, id. art. 41, or it could authorize collective military enforcement action to restore
international peace and security. Id. art. 42.
23. The Charter of the United Nations: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1945) (hereinafter Charter Hearings] (statement of Leo
Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State).
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
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Council might not always be able to act, or act promptly, Article 51 of
the Charter affirmed a state's inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense in response to an armed attack until the Security Council
could take effective action.25
Congressional supporters of the United Nations understood, back in
1945, that the powers conferred upon the Security Council (and on the
President who would contol the U.S. vote on the Council) could have
important implications for Congress's constitutional power to declare
war.26 In addressing the war powers issues raised by U.S. involvement
in the United Nations system, proponents of an active American role
sought to accommodate two concerns. First, they wanted to ensure that
American forces would be available on short notice to participate in mil-
itary actions approved by the Security Council. Second, they also
wanted to ensure a major role for Congress in shaping American mili-
tary commitments to the United Nations, especially in cases involving a
large-scale mobilization of U.S. forces.27 In the end, after careful
debate, Congress and the President accommodated these concerns by
striking a practical war powers balance, which is reflected in the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945 ("UNPA"). 28
The UNPA authorizes the President to negotiate an Article 43
agreement with the Security Council setting forth the number and type
of U.S. forces that will be available for the Council's use.2 9 Such an
agreement only takes effect, however, after Congress gives its consent
"by appropriate Act or joint resolution. '30 By approving a special agree-
ment, Congress effectively would give its preapproval to the President to
make those designated forces available to the Security Council in U.N.
military operations. Thus, the President would not need to seek Con-
gress's specific authorization to use those forces in individual cases.31
The President would need to return to Congress and obtain its authoriza-
tion, however, in order to provide U.S. forces beyond those set forth in
25. Id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security
... .1').
26. For an analysis of these issues, see Stromseth, supra note 3, at 607-12, 614-18.
27. Id.
28. Pub. L. No. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e (1988)).
29. 22 U.S.C. § 287d (1988).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 287d ("The President shall not be deemed to require the authorization of the
Congress to make available to the Security Council on its call in order to take action under article
42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or agreements the armed forces,
facilities, or assistance provided for therein .... ") (emphasis added).
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the agreement.32
By drawing this practical war powers line, Congress sought to give
the President the ability to respond promptly to small-scale threats to the
peace, but to preserve Congress's central role in cases involving large-
scale mobilization of U.S. forces. As it turned out, Article 43 agree-
ments were early casualties of the Cold War. The United States has not
yet concluded a special agreement with the Security Council, nor-in
the current political climate-is it likely to do so in the foreseeable
future. Moreover, until the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the tensions of the
Cold War largely prevented the Security Council from authorizing mili-
tary enforcement action. The only two exceptions were in 1950, when
the Council authorized a U.S.-led response to North Korea's invasion of
South Korea 33 and in 1966, when the Council authorized enforcement of
an embargo against Rhodesia.34
The Korea case deserves special scrutiny from the war powers
standpoint.35 President Truman did not seek Congress's approval either
before or after he sent American troops into combat-a stance seem-
ingly at odds with his 1945 understanding with Congress. At the time,
however, few members of Congress criticized Truman. Most agreed
with his judgment that the rapidly deteriorating situation in Korea
required a prompt and decisive U.S. response. Further, many felt that
Korea was a crucial test for the fledgling United Nations, whose success
was an important goal of American foreign policy. In claiming that the
President was not constitutionally required to obtain Congress's authori-
zation to send American forces into combat in Korea, the Truman
Administration advanced a number of arguments (some of which were
echoed by the Bush Administration during the Persian Gulf War,36 this
time to a much more skeptical Congress). Two of the Truman Adminis-
tration's main arguments viewed Security Council authorization of forci-
ble action as a factor enhancing presidential power and diminishing the
need for a prospective congressional role.
32. Id. For an examination of the legislative history of the UNPA, see War Powers Hearings,
supra note 21; Glennon, supra note 21, at 78-80; Stromseth, supra note 3, at 614-19.
33. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev. 1 (1950)
(recommending that U.N. member states "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the
area.").
34. S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966) (authorizing
limited forcible steps to enforce sanctions against Southern Rhodesia).
35. For an analysis of the war powers issues raised by American involvement in the U.N.-
authorized military action in Korea, see Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did
Truman Act?, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 21 (1995); Stromseth, supra note 3, at 620-40.
36. For a helpful discussion and critique of the main arguments advanced during the Gulf
War, see Peter Raven-Hansen, Remarks, in AMERICAN SOC'Y IrNr'L L.: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 85TH
ANNuAL MEETING 8-13 (1991).
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A. The Treaty "Take Care" Argument
The first of these arguments rests on the President's constitutional
responsibility as Chief Executive to "take care" that the law, including
U.S. treaty obligations, be "faithfully executed. '37 The basic claim is
that the President has the duty-and the power-to faithfully execute
the U.N. Charter by sending American forces into combat in military
operations approved by the Security Council, regardless of their size or
riskiness, without seeking the authorization of Congress.38 As the Tru-
man Administration put it: "The power to send troops abroad is cer-
tainly one of the powers which the President may exercise in carrying
out such a treaty as ... the United Nations Charter."39
But can a treaty obligate the United States (and empower the Presi-
dent) to send U.S. forces to war without prior congressional approval?
The Constitution stands supreme to any treaty, and it is doubtful that the
power to commence or declare war granted to Congress as a whole by
the Constitution can be superceded by a treaty approved by the Senate
alone.40 The Framers explicitly rejected a proposal to vest the power to
go to war in the Senate alone, despite its presumed expertise in foreign
37. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3 (the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed"); id. art. VI ("all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
38. In considering this claim, a distinction should be drawn between the President's
constitutional authority to carry out U.S. treaty obligations under the Take Care Clause, on the one
hand, and the President's authority to exercise U.S. rights under international law, including treaty
law, on the other. The President has the duty and the power to "take care" that U.S. treaty
obligations are "faithfully executed." The exercise of U.S. rights under international law, in
contrast, falls "largely within the President's foreign affairs authority" but "hardly seem[s] to be
within his responsibility to see that the law, even international law, is faithfully executed." Louis
HENKN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 331 n.56 (1972). Thus, under the U.N.
Charter, the President would only have "take care" power to execute obligations imposed by the
treaty, such as the obligation to abide by Security Council "decisions." U.N. CHARTER arts. 25, 48.
But see infra notes 44 to 51 and accompanying text (arguing that the U.N. Charter does not
impose an obligation on states to provide combat forces in the absence of an Article 43
agreement).
39. JOINT COMM. OF THE COMMS. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ON ARMED SERVICES, 82D
CONG., 1ST SESS., POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND THE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES 20 (Comm. Print 1951).
40. For arguments why a treaty constitutionally cannot commit the country to war, see
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 192-205 (1990); Note, Congress, the
President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1771, 1798-1800
(1968); see also S. Exec. Rep. No. 12, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1978) ("A treaty may not declare
war because the unique legislative history of the declaration-of-war clause ... clearly indicates
that the power was intended to reside jointly in the House of Representatives and the Senate.").
But see ELY, supra note 12, at 14-15, for a discussion of the uncertainties regarding original intent
on this issue; see also HENKN, supra note 38, at 159-160 ("It has often been said, too, that the
United States cannot declare war by treaty, only by resolution of Congress, though it is not clear
why that power is denied to the treaty-makers when other enumerated powers of Congress are
not.") (citation omitted).
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affairs and its likely critical role in ending wars through peace treaties.41
Instead, they wanted the people's direct representatives in the House
involved in the important decision to declare or commence war. Later,
during the Washington Administration, James Madison strenuously
rejected the idea that the President could invoke treaty obligations to
take the country into war "notwithstanding the express provision in the
constitution, by which the legislature is made the organ of the national
will, on questions, whether there be or be not a cause for declaring
war."42 Even Alexander Hamilton, who defended the President's
authority to interpret U.S. treaty obligations and to "preserve the bless-
ings of peace" by declaring neutrality in the war between Britain and
France, agreed that "the legislature can alone declare war, can alone
actually transfer the nation from a state of peace to a state of hostility. '43
Even if a treaty could obligate the United States (and empower the
President) to go to war without the authorization of Congress, the United
Nations Charter does not purport to do so. 44 The Charter empowers the
41. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (Max Farrand, ed.
1911) (proposal by Mr. Pickney to vest the power to make war in the Senate received no support).
While the debates accompanying the Constitution's framing and ratification do not address
directly the question whether a treaty can authorize war without subsequent action by Congress,
my own reading of that history convinces me that the founders' decision to vest the power to go to
war in both Houses of Congress, despite the Senate's expected greater expertise in matters of
foreign affairs, reflected special concerns about the seriousness of this decision and the need for
participation by the "people's House" both to make entry into war difficult and to ensure that the
decision enjoyed broad support. These concerns, in my view, make this power different from
other Article I, Section 8 powers, such as the commerce power, that have long been viewed as
properly the subject of self-executing treaties. Accord Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 780 & n.116 (1988).
42. THE LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUs 86 (J. and G.S. Gideon eds. 1845). Madison
urged rigid adherence "to the simple, the received, and the fundamental doctrine of the
constitution, that the power to declare war, including the power ofjudging of the causes of war, is
fully and exclusively vested in the legislature." Id. at 89 (emphasis in original). The executive
thus had no right, wrote Madison, to decide
whether there is or is not cause for declaring war; that the right of convening and
informing congress, whenever such a question seems to call for a decision, is all the
right which the constitution has deemed requisite or proper; and that for such, more
than for any other contingency, this right was specifically given to the executive.
Id.
43. Id. at 14. Hamilton emphasized, however, that "it belongs to the 'executive power' to do
whatever else the law of nations, cooperating with the treaties of the country, enjoin in the
intercourse of the United States with foreign powers." Id.
44. Nor do the various mutual defense treaties to which the United States is a party. ELY,
supra note 12, at 157 n.23; Michael J. Glennon, United States Mutual Security Treaties: The
Commitment Myth, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 509 (1986). The North Atlantic Treaty, for
instance, provides that its provisions shall be "carried out by the parties in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes." North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 11, 63 Stat. 2241,
34 U.N.T.S. 243. When the Senate was considering whether to give its advice and consent to this
treaty, moreover, the Executive branch assured Senators that the treaty did not preempt Congress's
constitutional power to declare war. Glennon, supra, at 530-35.
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Security Council to recommend or decide to take military action to
restore international peace and security,45 and member states are legally
obligated, under Articles 25 and 48, to carry out the Council's "deci-
sions."' 46 This obligation must be understood, however, in light of Arti-
cle 43, which together with the surrounding articles of Chapter VII
reflects an understanding that the Security Council cannot order or
require a state to commit its forces to military action in the absence of an
Article 43 agreement ratified according to that state's "constitutional
processes.' 7 This conclusion is reinforced by the language of Article
106,48 as well as by the legislative history surrounding both the negotia-
tion of the Charter and the Senate's decision to approve it.49 As the
Secretary of State explained in his 1945 report to President Truman on
the U.N. Charter, "No Member of the United Nations can be called upon
to supply . . . forces which are not provided for in the agreements." 50
Furthermore, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the U.N. Charter
on the understanding that any special agreement making American
forces available to the Security Council would be approved by Congress
in advance.5
45. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42.
46. In Article 25, "[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id. art. 25. Article 48
provides that "[t]he action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United
Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine." Id. art 48.
47. This conclusion is based on Article 43 and on inferences from other articles of Chapter
VII, particularly articles 39, 42, 44, 45, 48 and 49. Accord Schachter, supra note 3, at 464-65.
Other Security Council "decisions" not involving the use of armed force, in contrast, do not
presuppose the existence of Article 43 agreements. Thus, the Security Council has decided to
impose economic sanctions, pursuant to articles 39 and 41, on a number of occasions, and states
have been legally obligated to carry out those decisions. E.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990) (imposing economic sanctions on Iraq).
48. Article 106 indicates that the drafters of the U.N. Charter expected that the Security
Council would exercise its enforcement powers under Article 42 using forces made available by
member states in Article 43 agreements. In the meantime, the five permanent members of the
Security Council would consult and voluntarily assist the Security Council in meeting its
responsibilities. U.N. CHARTER art. 106.
49. Glennon, supra note 21, at 76-78. The U.S. Senate debates preceding U.S. ratification of
the Charter reflect a widespread understanding that only by concluding a special agreement,
approved by Congress, would the United States undertake specific obligations to provide forces to
the Security Council for U.N. military action. At the same time, several senators argued that U.S.
ratification of the treaty created an obligation on the part of the United States to enter into a
special agreement of some sort. Stromseth, supra note 3, at 604-06, 612-14, 620 & n. 117.
50. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO CONFERENCE 95 (1945).
51. This understanding was explicitly re-affirmed in section 6 of the United Nations
Participation Act, 59 Stat. 621 ("The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or
agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of Congress by
appropriate Act or joint resolution...").
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As a practical matter, moreover, the Security Council has never
ordered or required states to use force. Instead, it has recommended or
authorized states to voluntarily take military action.5 2 Thus, in Korea,
the Security Council "recommended" that member states help "repel the
armed attack."' 53  After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council
"decided" to impose economic sanctions, 54 and then "call[ed] upon"
member states with maritime forces in the region to help enforce the
sanctions." The Security Council subsequently "authorized" the use of
"all necessary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait.56 The Council, how-
ever, has never "decided" that states must use military force. Thus, the
President has never been legally obligated to "execute" the U.N. Charter
by committing U.S. forces to combat in a specific case.
Moreover, under the United Nations Participation Act, the Presi-
dent can claim no authorization from the Congress to commit U.S.
forces to combat in Chapter VII operations in the absence of a special
agreement approved by Congress. 57 The President thus must either
come to Congress for specific authorization in an individual case or act
within the President's own defensive powers as Commander in Chief, to
which I will now turn. In sum, the President cannot "execute" the U.N.
Charter without regard to the war powers of Congress.58
B. The "Police Action" Argument
A second argument advanced during the Korean and Persian Gulf
Wars for allowing the President to commit troops to combat without
Congress's approval is that military actions authorized by the Security
Council are not "war" or "acts of war" under international law, but
instead are defensive "police actions" to protect international peace and
security. Some officials and scholars thus have contended that the Presi-
dent can commit American forces to these military actions, regardless of
the combat risks involved, based on his defensive powers as Com-
52. Neither Article 39 nor Article 42 preclude the Security Council from recommending or
authorizing collective military action with non-Article 43 forces.
53. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess. , at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF.4/REV.1 (1950).
54. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
55. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., at 21-22, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
56. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
57. Section 7 of the UNPA does authorize the President, however, to deploy up to 1000 U.S.
military personnel to "serve as observers, guards, or in any noncombatant capacity" in U.N.
peacekeeping operations that do not involve "the employment of armed forces contemplated by
chapter VII of the United Nations Charter." U.S.C. § 287d-l(a).
58. Under the War Powers Resolution, moreover, authority to introduce U.S. forces into
hostilities "shall not be inferred .. . from any treaty" unless the treaty is implemented by
legislation that specifically authorizes introducing U.S. forces into hostilities. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1547(a)(2) (1982).
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mander in Chief.5 9 Although the build-up to the Gulf War allowed
plenty of time for congressional deliberation, proponents of this view
argued that the President did not need Congress's authorization to send
American forces into battle against Iraq.60
To claim that the President can send American troops into combat
without the approval of Congress whenever the Security Council autho-
rizes forcible action, regardless of the circumstances, size, or riskiness of
the collective military action, goes too far. The fact that a U.N.-
approved military action is not an "act of war" under international law
does not, by itself, dispose of the constitutional question. The United
Nations Charter altered the international categories of analysis some-
what: the Charter speaks not of "war" but of the "use of force," and it
provides that forcible action is legal under international law if authorized
by the Security Council or if undertaken in self-defense. 61 But even uses
of force that are lawful under the Charter can constitute "war" for U.S.
constitutional purposes (and thus require congressional approval)
because of the nature and circumstances of the operation and the magni-
tude of the combat risks involved. Examples include the U.N.-author-
ized military actions to expel Iraq from Kuwait and to defend South
Korea. These "police actions" involved risks and sacrifices of the sort
that led the founders to give Congress the power to commence war.62
59. President Truman and officials in both the executive and legislative branches advanced
this view during the Korean War. Stromseth, supra note 3, at 629-30, 633-35. A number of
scholars also advocated this position during the Gulf War. E.g. Thomas M. Frank & Faiza Patel,
UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth ", 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64, 67-69
(1991).
When the President decides to risk the use of armed force in cooperation with the
United Nations or other treaty partners in an effort to restore peace and end armed
aggression, he is not 'initiating' a 'war' but defending the rule of law. No
'declaration of war' is necessary or appropriate in such circumstances.
War Powers Hearings, supra note 21, at 426 (statement of Robert F. Turner, Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law).
60. E.g., Thomas M. Frank, Declare War? Congress Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at
A27 ("Congress has neither a constitutional obligation nor a right to declare war before the U.S.
joins in a U.N.-sponsored police action in the Persian Gulf.").
61. For helpful discussions of the law of the U.N. Charter regarding the use of force, see
ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (1993);
Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and US. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE (1991).
62. Even those who first embraced the "police action" concept at the time of the Charter's
ratification recognized that U.N. military operations involving a large mobilization of U.S. forces
would implicate Congress's constitutional power to declare war. Stromseth, supra note 3, at 608-
12 (discussing views of scholars, exeputive branch officials, and members of Congress).
The distinction between U.N. "police action" and "war" was first advanced in the mid-I 940s
by a group of legal scholars and former officials grappling with the difficult war powers issues
raised by the U.N. Charter. John W. Davis et al., Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1944.
This letter was placed in the Congressional Record during the floor debate on the U.N. Charter. 91
CONG. REC. 8065 (1945). The authors included John W. Davis, W.W. Grant, Philip C. Jessup,
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In such cases, the Security Council can hardly be seen as an ade-
quate substitute for the kind of check on unilateral presidential action
that the founders sought in Congress. While a variety of viewpoints are
represented on the Council, U.S. Presidents generally have been able to
exert considerable influence and obtain authorizing resolutions when
they wanted to take military action. In Korea, the Persian Gulf, and
Haiti, for example, the Council acted more as a rubber stamp than a
constraint on presidential decisions to use force. Moreover, even if
Security Council authorization is the result of a long diplomatic struggle,
the democratic concerns that led the founders to give the war-commenc-
ing power to Congress are not satisfied by the vote of a body that neither
represents the American people as a whole nor is politically accountable
to them. Instead, the question whether the lives of American citizens
should be placed at risk is for Congress to answer.
To be sure, the President as Commander in Chief clearly has the
authority under the Constitution (and under Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter) to repel sudden attacks against the United States and its forces. But
neither original intent nor subsequent historical practice provide strong
support for the claim that the President unilaterally can commit Ameri-
can forces to combat on a substantial scale to defend other countries or
their citizens from attack, even if the Security Council has authorized the
operation. 63 The founders distinguished between "commencing" war
and "repelling" it, but nothing in the framing and ratification debates
suggests that they intended the President to have the power to repel sud-
den attacks on countries other than the United States.64 Concern at the
time to avoid entangling alliances or involvement in "the commotions of
George Rublee, James T. Shotwell, and Quincy Wright. Id. at 8067. They argued that the United
States could place a limited number of forces at the Security Council's disposal without raising
constitutional problems because "their use, while adequate to deal with minor disturbances of
international peace, would not create a situation of war in either the constitutional or international
sense." 91 CONG. REc. 8066 (1945). Such limited "police forces" would be analogous, they
argued, to those traditionally deployed by Presidents "to protect American citizens abroad, to
prevent an invasion of the territory, or to suppress insurrection." Id. They also recognized,
however, that a substantial commitment of American forces to a U.N. operation might
nevertheless constitute "war" in the constitutional sense and thus require congressional approval.
Id. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1945, John Foster Dulles
likewise contended that the war powers of Congress were not implicated "[i]f we are talking about
a little bit of force necessary to be used as a police demonstration." Charter Hearings, supra note
23, at 655. However, "if this is going to be a large volume of force which is going to put a big
drain on the resources of the United States or commit us to great and costly adventures, then the
Congress ought to have a voice in this matter." Id.
63. Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in THE U.S.
CONsTTrrUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 35-36 (Gary M. Stem & Morton H. Halperin eds.
1994).
64. Id. at 42-43; Note, supra note 40, at 1783-84.
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Europe" suggest an intent to the contrary.6" Nor is there a "systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Con-
gress and never before questioned, '66 of committing American forces to
combat in defense of allies. As Professor Raven-Hansen astutely
observes,
isolated interventions to shore up friendly foreign governments in
distress, some of Franklin Roosevelt's initiatives in anticipation of
our entry into World War II and the Korean War may supply prece-
dents, [but] they are at once too few, too dissimilar, and too ambigu-
ous to constitute the kind of systematic, unbroken and long-pursued
practice, or to give the kind of clear notice to Congress, necessary to
establish customary law.67
Nor has Congress acquiesced in any long-standing practice of unilateral
presidential action to defend or rescue foreign citizens at risk.68
In exceptional cases, the President may determine that aggression
short of an attack or imminent attack against the United States poses a
threat to the country's security that is serious enough to warrant dis-
patching American forces into combat within a time frame that pre-
cludes prior approval from Congress. 69 In the real world, however, few
U.N.-authorized military actions are likely to fall in this category.
Rather, in most cases, a long diplomatic buildup will proceed Security
Council approval of the use of force, making it hard to argue that emer-
gency presidential action is required. "True emergencies" where time
does not permit resort to Congress should be distinguished from the
"ongoing crises" that regularly come before the Security Council for
65. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1836) (remarks of
James Wilson). As Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: "we ... are not obliged to
throw ourselves into the scale with any." Id.
66. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). As Justice Frankfurter recognized, historical practice can help to clarify ambiguous
or open-ended constitutional provisions, but it cannot "supplant" clear constitutional requirements.
Id.; Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 (1940) ("illegality cannot obtain
legitimacy through practice"). In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981), the
Supreme Court embraced Frankfurter's approach to historical practice. For a helpful discussion,
see Raven-Hansen, supra note 63, at 31-32.
67. Raven-Hansen, supra note 63, at 42-43.
68. In a few cases, such as the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 and the U.S. intervention in
the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Presidents argued that in addition to protecting American
citizens, they were also protecting citizens of other countries. See A CoNn'ILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1902, at 113-21 (James D. Richardson ed.
Supp. 1903) (President McKinley's message to the Senate and House of Representatives regarding
the Boxer Rebellion in China); 53 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 19-21 (1965) (statement of President
Johnson regarding the situation in the Dominican Republic). These few examples do not add up
to a systematic and long-standing practice, however. Protection of Americans, moreover, was
stressed as the basic reason for these actions.
69. ELY, supra note 12, at 6-7.
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deliberation and response. If the Security Council has time to deliberate
in these crises, Congress usually will too. The North Korean attack
against South Korea in 1950 arguably presented a true emergency, but
even in that case President Truman could have sought congressional
authorization within the first few days of the attack. In the Gulf War,
whether the military operation to liberate Kuwait is viewed as an exer-
cise of "collective self-defense" approved by the Security Council in
advance or as a United Nations "enforcement action," the lengthy mili-
tary and diplomatic buildup to that action provided plenty of time for
Congress to vote. The same was true in Haiti as well.
In short, the fact that a military operation is authorized by the
United Nations-and thus is ostensibly "defensive" in nature-does not
automatically mean that it falls within the President's power as Com-
mander in Chief to "repel sudden attacks." On the contrary, each U.N.
military operation must be examined individually on its facts. Some
U.N. "police actions," such as those in Korea and the Gulf, involving
combat on a major scale, are "war" for constitutional purposes and thus
require the authorization of Congress.
C. Peacekeeping
Few U.N.-authorized "police actions" entail combat of the magni-
tude involved in Korea or the Persian Gulf, however. Therefore the
question arises whether the President needs congressional authorization
to commit U.S. forces to U.N. operations that fall well short of major
warfighting contingencies. Examples of such actions include, first, con-
sensual "peacekeeping" operations that involve relatively little risk of
combat, and second, Chapter VII "peace enforcement" operations in
which force is used but on a limited scale. Each should be considered in
turn.
Peacekeeping developed during the Cold War period as a creative
technique for containing conflicts without running up against the super-
power impasse on the Security Council. Although the Charter does not
provide for it expressly, peacekeeping is a reasonable extension of
Chapter VI's provisions for peaceful dispute resolution.70 In traditional
peacekeeping operations, lightly armed forces (and in some cases
unarmed observers) are deployed with the consent of the parties to a
conflict to undertake tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling
buffer zones. In some recent cases, such as Cambodia, El Salvador, and
Namibia, peacekeepers have been attached to more complex, multi-coin-
70. U.N. CHARTER ch. VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes"). Recognizing that peacekeeping
goes beyond the express provisions of Chapter VI, a U.N. publication stated, "it is almost
necessary to imagine a new 'Chapter Six and a Half.' " THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 4, at 5.
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ponent operations that go beyond ceasefire monitoring and involve tasks
such as supervising elections, monitoring human rights, disarming and
demobilizing former combatants, repatriating refugees, and coordinating
rehabilitation assistance. In both simple and complex operations, how-
ever, peacekeepers generally are authorized to use force only in a mini-
mum and proportionate fashion, and only in self-defense.7
Under the United Nations Participation Act, as amended in 1949,
Congress authorized the President to send up to 1,000 U.S. troops to
participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. 72 During the Cold War
period, however, the superpowers generally did not contribute troops to
peacekeeping missions. As of January 1996, however, U.S. forces are
playing a significant role in several peacekeeping operations. Approxi-
mately 300 U.S. forces are deployed in Macedonia under U.N. command
to help deter the Balkan conflict from spreading.73 In Haiti, over 2,000
U.S. troops participate in the U.N. peacekeeping operation that took over
from the initial U.S.-led troop deployment restoring President Aristide to
power.
7 4
If all of the parties to a conflict (not just some of them) consent to
and support establishing a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, the
chances that the peacekeeping forces will become embroiled in hostili-
ties or face significant combat risks will be, in most cases, relatively
low. The President, thus, would not require Congress's authorization
under the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution to deploy U.S.
troops to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations that enjoy the clear and
continuing support of all parties. Such operations can be viewed as
peacetime troop deployments for foreign policy purposes. Although the
Constitution does not expressly allocate the power to deploy U.S. forces
overseas in peacetime, the President as Commander in Chief (and chief
diplomat) has engaged in a long-standing historical practice of ordering
such deployments, generally with the acquiescence of Congress. Con-
gress has concurrent constitutional power to regulate peacetime troop
deployments abroad,75 but for prudential reasons successive Congresses
71. Self-defense has been defined to include defense against armed elements who attempt to
prevent peacekeepers from carrying out their mandate. Adam Roberts, From San Francisco to
Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force, 37 SURVIVAL 7, 14 (1995-96). For a helpful study of
U.N. peacekeeping operations and practices, see THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING: CASE
STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (William J. Durch ed. 1993); see also THE BLUE HELMETS,
supra note 4.
72. See supra note 57 (discussing § 7 of the UNPA).
73. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Peacekeeping Operations in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 20 (Jan. 8, 1994).
74. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 452-53 (Mar.
21, 1995).
75. Congress has the constitutional power to raise, support, and regulate the military forces,
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generally have been willing to allow the President considerable
flexibility. 76
Nonetheless, the fact that an operation can be characterized as
"peacekeeping" may not always be sufficient to settle the question of
presidential authority. Some peacekeeping operations, because of their
unique circumstances, are more problematic cases for unilateral presi-
dential action. The deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia to help imple-
ment the Dayton peace accords is a case in point. On the one hand, prior
congressional authorization may not have been constitutionally com-
pelled in this case because American troops were deployed with the con-
sent of the parties for the limited purposes of monitoring a cease-fire and
separating the previously warring factions as part of a negotiated peace
settlement accepted by all sides. On the other hand, the bitter history of
the Bosnian conflict and the fragile nature of the peace agreement, cou-
pled with the robust enforcement powers given to the U.S. and allied
forces, argue in favor of congressional authorization. Clinton Adminis-
tration officials have dealt with this dilemma, in part, by stating that
while force will be used, if necessary, to compel rogue elements to com-
ply with the agreement, the United States does not intend to become
embroiled in a war in the event that the peace agreement collapses and
the parties resume hostilities. 7 Yet the substantial commitment of com-
bat-ready American troops and resources to such an unsettled region for
an extended period of time reinforces the argument for congressional
authorization.
D. Peace Enforcement
Many U.N. operations authorized by the Security Council fall into a
middle category between major combat actions and consensual
peacekeeping. Recent "peace enforcement" operations authorized under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter have involved military action against
hostile parties, but on a much smaller and more limited scale than in the
Persian Gulf. In Somalia, for example, the Security Council authorized
which can reasonably encompass legislative restrictions on their overseas deployment. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14. Under the War Powers Resolution, the President must report to
Congress within 48 hours when U.S. forces are introduced "into the territory, airspace or waters of
a foreign nation, while equipped for combat." 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(2)(1988). These deployments
do not, however, trigger the 60-day time clock.
76. This may be changing in the U.N. context, however. The House of Representatives has
passed provisions that, if they were to become law, would severely limit U.S. involvement in U.N.
peacekeeping operations. See Pat Towell, House Votes to Sharply Rein in US. Peacekeeping
Expenses, CONG. Q., Feb. 18, 1995, at 535 (discussing provisions of H.R.7, the National Security
Revitalization Act).
77. E.g., The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS televison broadcast, Dec. 4, 1995) (interview
with Secretary of Defense William Perry).
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efforts to apprehend Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, after
forces loyal to him killed twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers. 8 In
October 1993, eighteen American soldiers died in one such effort.7s In
Bosnia, prior to the Dayton accords, American pilots protecting U.N.
safe haven zones participated in numerous NATO air strikes against
Bosnian Serb military targets. In September 1994, American combat
forces were on the verge of invading Haiti, with Security Council
approval, 80 to depose the Cedras regime and restore President Aristide to
power, when last-minute diplomacy rendered the invasion a friendly
one.
Whether the Constitution is best understood as requiring Con-
gress's approval before the President commits American combat forces
to U.N. "peace enforcement" operations such as these is a hard question.
The answer will depend on the particular circumstances, risks, and
objectives of the operation at issue. The constitutional arguments in
favor of advance congressional authorization were compelling, in my
view, in a case like the originally planned invasion of Haiti, in which
American forces were prepared to overthrow a de facto regime with
force.8" The Declare War Clause gives Congress the power to declare or
commence war, whether full-fledged war or more limited acts of war.82
That the founders wanted even limited hostilities short of formally
declared war to be authorized by Congress is reinforced by the Marque
and Reprisal Clause, 3 which gave Congress control over limited uses of
force, such as reprisals, common in the founders' day.84 The founders
understood both that reprisals could be a useful half-way step between
78. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993). See infra note 110
(discussing this resolution).
79. JOHN L. HIRSCH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE:
REFLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING 127 (1995).
80. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
81. Accord Lori F. Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military
Engagements, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 65-67 (1995).
82. FRANCES D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 17-53 (2d ed.
1986); Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L. J. 672 (1972).
83. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
84. As Abraham Sofaer persuasively argues, "[tihe Constitution says Congress shall 'declare'
war, and it seems unreasonable to contend that the President was given the power to 'make'
undeclared war, especially since the Constitution gives Congress control of those types of military
actions short of formal war commonly resorted to during that time." ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 4 (1976) (citation omitted). For
thoughtful discussions of the Marque and Reprisal Clause, see Jules Lobel, Covert War and
Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1035 (1986)
[hereinafter Covert War]; Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REv.
61 (1995); Lofgren, supra note 82.
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peace and war, and that they often led to war.85 In Thomas Jefferson's
words: "The making of a reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing...
[which] is an act of war, and never failed to produce it in the case of a
nation able to make war." Thus, "the right of reprisal [is] expressly
lodged with [Congress] by the Constitution, and not the executive. '8 6 In
short, the decision whether to commence even limited acts of war is for
Congress to make because of the potentially serious consequences of
committing the country to such action, including the risk of escalation to
a wider conflict. Advance legislative deliberation, moreover, provides
greater assurance of popular support for military action that places
American lives and treasure at risk. 7
But do many U.N. "peace enforcement" operations today, such as
the efforts to apprehend Aideed in Somalia or the NATO airstrikes in
Bosnia, raise the kinds of concerns or pose the kinds of risks that led the
founders to give Congress the power to commence even limited acts of
war? Each U.N. operation would need to be examined carefully on its
facts to answer that question. Nevertheless, a few cautious generaliza-
tions can be made. First, Chapter VII "peace enforcement" operations
generally will involve coercive action against hostile forces in unstable
situations. Even if combat risks seem low at the outset, the chances that
a conflict will escalate and that hostilities will intensify cannot always
be predicted accurately. After the Somalia operation focused on appre-
hending Aideed, it took more American lives and a more substantial
commitment of American resources than anyone in the Clinton Admin-
istration (or many in Congress) expected at the start. Second, congres-
sional and public support for American involvement in "peace
enforcement" operations generally will be critical to their success, even
if they do not involve major or sustained hostilities. Most of these oper-
ations will not be completed in a few short months. Instead, they are
likely to involve long-term commitments, and they will be expensive.
Moreover, if the operations do not implicate core U.S. security interests,
the American public will have a very low tolerance for casualties. If
Presidents commit U.S. forces to such operations unilaterally without
making a strong public case for U.S. involvement and obtaining legisla-
tive support, American policy will be particularly vulnerable to abrupt
reversal by Congress in the face of adversity.
This does not mean that I discount the counterarguments that can
be made from historical practice. On the contrary, the argument that the
85. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1171 (1833).
86. Op. Sec'y of State (May 16, 1793) (Thomas Jefferson), reprinted in 7 JOHN MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (1906).
87. Lobel, Covert War, supra note 84, at 1089-91.
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President does not require congressional approval before committing
U.S. forces to those Chapter VII "peace enforcement" operations that
involve minimal combat risks or escalatory potential must be taken seri-
ously. The initial humanitarian deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia in
Operation Restore Hope as it was first conceived and launched, for
example, can be viewed as falling within a long-standing presidential
practice, in which Congress has largely acquiesced, of deploying Ameri-
can forces abroad for limited protective purposes that do not involve
initiating hostilities or engaging in war. The most well-established pres-
idential practice is that of using force in a limited and self-contained
manner to protect and rescue American citizens at risk abroad-a prac-
tice that is now widely accepted as falling within the President's custom-
ary authority as Commander in Chief.88 Yet one must be cautious in
generalizing from this historical practice because its relevance for U.N.
operations is debatable in situations that involve no imminent threat to
American lives or to core U.S. security interests.89
In sum, given the spectrum of U.N.-authorized military actions, the
authority of the President to commit American forces without congres-
sional approval will vary depending on the nature and risks of each oper-
ation. At one end of the spectrum are actions that clearly have the
character and risks of "war" and are best understood as requiring the
prior authorization of Congress. At the other end of the spectrum are
Chapter VI peacekeeping operations that enjoy the consent of all of the
parties and are deployed in situations posing little risk of hostilities.
Although Congress may limit American involvement in such peacekeep-
ing operations, the President has a strong argument that sending Ameri-
can forces to these operations falls within well-established historical
patterns of presidential peacetime troop deployments. Many if not most
of the U.N.-authorized operations in which the United States is likely to
participate, however, will fall into the more ambiguous middle ground.
These include Chapter VII "peace enforcement" operations involving
hostilities, but on a limited scale. Strong constitutional arguments in
88. Raven-Hansen, supra note 63, at 37-40.
89. Whether and when it is reasonable to extrapolate from the President's long-standing
practice of protecting Americans to claim that the President may use limited force (with Security
Council approval) to protect foreign citizens was a question debated back in 1945 when the Senate
considered the U.N. Charter. Sen. Arthur Vandenberg argued that the President's long-standing
practice of deploying troops abroad to protect Americans meant that he could also engage in
limited "police actions" to defend foreign countries and their citizens without needing the specific
approval of Congress in each case, while Senator Wheeler strongly disputed the analogy between
these situations. Even Vandenberg expected, however, that the American forces used for U.N.
police actions would be designated in an Article 43 special agreement that was approved by
Congress. Stromseth, supra note 3, at 605, 610-11.
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favor of congressional authorization can be made in many such cases,9"
but grey areas and room for disagreement admittedly will exist.
III. POST-COLD WAR INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMIcs: WILL THE "TACIT
DEAL" CONTINUE?
This brings me to the second issue I would like to explore: Is Con-
gress likely to play a greater role in decisions to commit U.S. forces
abroad in the post-Cold War period, or will the "tacit deal" of unilateral
presidential action and congressional "scolding rights" after the fact sim-
ply continue as before?
John Ely finds little reason to believe that the President, unprodded,
will "move back in the direction of sharing responsibility" for decisions
to send American forces to combat, or that Congress will show any
greater willingness to accept its own responsibility to participate in such
decisions.9 The Persian Gulf War was authorized by Congress in
advance, but Ely suggests it would be "folly" to view this as "the proce-
dural wave of the future. 92 Congress's willingness to take a prospec-
tive stand (even at the eleventh hour) was influenced by several factors
that made the Gulf War unique: the projected size of the conflict clearly
made it a "war"; the lengthy buildup to the conflict precluded any claim
that time did not permit congressional debate; and the President, by ulti-
mately deciding to seek Congress's "support," denied Congress "the
usual option of waiting until the war was over before deciding whether
to approve of it."93
While the President recognized the political benefit of obtaining
congressional authorization before undertaking an action posing sub-
stantial combat risks, this precedent is less likely to be followed, Ely
contends, "in our now more common predictably 'quickie' wars. 94
Moreover, in military actions since Desert Storm, such as in Somalia
and Bosnia, Ely argues, Congress and the President "reverted entirely to
form" with no "conspicuous indication on anyone's part that Congress
might have a role to play under either the Constitution or the War Pow-
ers Resolution. 95
90. The U.S. military operation in Haiti, as it was originally launched by the President in
September 1993 before Cedras agreed to voluntarily relinquish power, was a strong case for prior
congressional approval, in my judgment. Accord Damrosch, supra note 81, at 66.
91. Ely, supra note 12, at 52-54. Thus Ely argues in favor of enlisting the courts as
"Congress-prodders" who will "remand" cases to the Congress for it to do its constitutional duty.
Id. at 54-67.
92. Id. at 52.
93. Id. at 50-51.
94. Id. at 51.
95. Id. at 52.
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Ely's description of the "tacit deal" between the President and Con-
gress during the Cold War era is hard to dispute. He correctly identifies
congressional reluctance to accept responsibility for use-of-force deci-
sions (and not just presidential defiance) as a major factor in the decline
of Congress's war powers role. But Ely's prediction that the patterns of
the past are likely to continue largely as before may not bear out com-
pletely in the post-Cold War years ahead.96
For three interrelated reasons, Congress may play a more signifi-
cant war powers role in the future, especially in the U.N. context. First
and foremost, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the
Cold War rivalry have ushered in a new era in American foreign policy
in which there is no one overarching threat. Containing communism is
no longer the unifying theme of American foreign relations. In the
absense of a foreign policy consensus and in the face of more ambiguous
security threats, members of Congress generally will face fewer electoral
risks in opposing the President's foreign policy decisions.97 Accusations
of being "soft on communism" or "weak on defense" will no longer
constrain legislators from challenging presidential choices on defense
policy or the use of force abroad.
Second, in a world no longer dominated by Cold War tensions,
considerable uncertainty and disagreement exists among policy makers
and among the American public at large about the nature of American
interests in the world. While traditional concerns about the physical and
economic security of the United States will continue at the heart of
American foreign policy, as will concerns about the security of our key
allies, questions about America's role in response to more indirect
threats to our long-term well-being will be controversial and potentially
divisive. Whether threats to core American values, such as democracy
and basic human rights, merit committing American military forces in
particular cases will be a question on which reasonable people will often
disagree. Moreover, in cases that touch less directly on traditional
American security concerns, the public will be less willing to tolerate
American casualties. Congress, as a result, is likely to scrutinize such
involvements closely and stand willing to challenge the President.
Third, in the face of more ambiguous and less immediate security
96. Ely notes that the end of the Cold War may augur well for a greater judicial role. Id. at
54-64. He views the Cold War as an aberration from earlier patterns ofjoint decisionmaking, but
does not explore whether the structural changes in the international system resulting from the Cold
War's demise might affect the institutional interaction of Congress and the President over war
powers.
97. Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsey, Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An
Overview and Preview, in CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL
HILL 3,13 (Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsey eds. 1993).
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threats, Congress and the American public are likely to focus their atten-
tion on domestic economic priorities and to be cautious about expensive
military commitments abroad that compete for scarce resources. As a
result, Congress's power of the purse will give it a major role in deter-
mining U.S. involvement in costly U.N. peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations.
But critical questions remain: How precisely will Congress exert
its influence? Is Congress likely to continue, as it did during the Cold
War, to play a largely retrospective role, challenging Presidential deci-
sions to deploy force after the fact, rather than insisting on a greater
prospective role? Or will members of Congress in the future be more
willing (and able) to share responsibility for deployment decisions? And
if Congress does not vote in advance, does this simply reflect a desire to
avoid accountability or are other factors also involved? A brief look at
the cases of Somalia and Haiti-and the executive-legislative interac-
tions accompanying the deployment of U.S. forces-may suggest some
answers.
A. Somalia
When President Bush decided to deploy over 20,000 American
forces to Somalia in December 1992 in Operation Restore Hope to cre-
ate a secure environment for delivering humanitarian relief, he did not
seek congressional approval for the mission.9 8 At the time, few in Con-
gress argued that he should have. Most congressional leaders supported
the humanitarian mission on the merits,9 9 and few thought there was any
significant risk of hostilities or war. The Senate, two months after the
initial deployment, adopted a resolution by voice vote authorizing the
participation of American forces in the initial U.S.-led phase of the
Somalia operation. 00 The House did not vote for three more months.
By then, the Somalia operation had entered a second and more
ambitious phase. With the Clinton Administration's strong support, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 814 in late March 1993.101 That
resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized the
98. Congress was not in session at the time. President Bush did meet with congressional
leaders, however, on Dec. 4, a few hours before announcing his decision to the nation. MacNeil!
Lehrer Newshour: Operation Restore Hope (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 4, 1992) (interview
with Speaker of the House Thomas Foley).
99. Id.; Clifford Krauss, A Few in Congress Advising Caution, or Vote, on Somalia, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1992, at A13.
100. S.J. Res. 45, reprinted in 139 CONG. REc. S1368 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1993). The Senate
joint resolution authorized the President to use U.S. armed forces to implement Security Council
Resolution 794, which in turn approved the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Id.
101. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993).
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United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to replace the U.S.-
commanded operation and to engage in a number of tasks. In addition to
emphasizing the disarmament of Somali factions,' the Security Coun-
cil also authorized UNOSOM II to assist in the economic rehabilitation
of Somalia and to promote political reconciliation and help reestablish
political institutions and civil administration throughout the country. 0 3
Of the approximately 20,000 combat forces and 8000 logistics forces
from various countries participating in UNOSOM II, the United States
agreed to contribute about 2700 logistical forces and place them under
U.N. command. President Clinton also agreed to provide a U.S. quick
reaction force of about 1300 troops under U.S. command to support
UNOSOM 11.104 Control of the Somalia operation passed from the
United States to the United Nations on May 4, 1993.
After a divisive debate along party lines, the House adopted a reso-
lution a few weeks later authorizing American participation in
UNOSOM II for twelve months. 10 5 The resolution explicitly provided
specific statutory authorization under the War Powers Resolution "to the
extent that" any U.S. forces became involved in hostilities or imminent
hostilities.'06 Democratic leaders in the House viewed this authorization
as an important assertion of congressional prerogative; Republicans
argued that Congress, instead, was giving the President a blank check in
Somalia.'07 Disagreement on the merits of UNOSOM II also followed
party lines. Democrats stressed the importance of continued American
involvement in Somalia in order to consolidate and build upon the
accomplishments of Operation Restore Hope; they also emphasized that
U.S. forces were cutting back their role in Somalia. 0 8 Republicans
voiced concern about the far-reaching objectives of the overall operation
and argued that U.S. forces had accomplished their original humanita-
102. Id., § B, 7.
103. Id., § A, 4.
104. House COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE USE OF UNITED
STATES FORCES IN SOMALIA, H.R. REP. No. 89, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 2, 7 (1995) [hereinafter
House Somalia Report]; 139 CONG. Rc. H2611-12 (daily ed. May 20, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton).
105. The vote was 243 to 179. 139 CONG. Rc. H2764 (daily ed. May 25, 1993). Only 9
Democrats voted against the resolution, and only 3 Republicans voted for it. Gregory J. Bowens,
Somalia: House Backs Measure Allowing U.S. Role in U.N. Operations, CONG. Q., May 29, 1993,
at 1382. The text of S.J. Res. 45 is reprinted at 139 CONG. Rac. H2745 (daily ed. May 25, 1993).
The resolution authorized the President to use American forces in UNOSOM II for two purposes:
to provide logistical support to the U.N.-led force, and to serve as a quick reaction force under
U.S. operational control to respond to requests from the U.N. commander in Somalia for
emergency assistance. S.J. Res. 45, § 4(a)(l)-(3).
106. Id. § 4(b).
107. These differences of view are set forth clearly in the majority and minority reports
accompanying the House version of S.J. Res. 45. House Somalia Report, supra note 104.
108. E.g., 139 CONG. Rc. H2611 (daily ed. May 20, 1993) (remarks of Rep. Hamilton).
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rian mission and should come home. 10 9
Any plans to reconcile the House and Senate authorizations (and
obtain Senate approval of a U.S. role in UNOSOM II) were soon
eclipsed by escalating violence in Somalia beginning in June 1993.
After Somali forces loyal to General Aideed killed twenty-four Pakistani
peacekeepers, U.N. forces were authorized to apprehend Aideed." ° As
part of this effort, President Clinton deployed U.S. Army Rangers to
Somalia. He did not seek Congress's approval, however, for the subse-
quent combat operations against Aideed's forces during the summer and
early fall of 1993. Nor did the President provide Congress or the Ameri-
can people with a full and clear explanation of American objectives in
Somalia or the likely risks ahead.
As the Somalia operation focused on capturing Aideed, its charac-
ter changed and hostilities intensified."' As violence in Mogadishu
increased, tensions in Washington between Congress and the executive
branch mounted as well. Amid growing calls to narrow or end U.S.
participation, Senator Robert Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, introduced an amendment to the defense appropria-
tions bill in September 1993 to terminate funding for U.S. involvement
in Somalia within thirty days unless Congress authorized a continued
U.S. role." 2 Working with congressional leaders of both parties, the
Clinton Administration turned back this effort. Instead, the Senate
adopted a nonbinding amendment calling on the President to report by
mid-October on the goals of the U.S. forces in Somalia and to seek Con-
gress's authorization by mid-November for their continued deploy-
ment. 13 The House followed suit two weeks later." 4  Although this
provision was nonbinding, Senator Byrd made it clear that he would
insist on a congressional vote on November 15 and would work to termi-
109. E.g., id. at H2610 (remarks of Rep. Gilman); id. at H2609 (remarks of Rep. Solomon).
110. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993). More precisely,
that resolution condemned the attacks against U.N. peacekeepers, id. 1, and reaffirmed the
Secretary-General's authority "to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the
armed attacks," including "investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention" for trial.
Id. 5. For background on this resolution, see HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 79, at 118.
Although "[t]he resolution did not demand military action," Hirsch and Oakley argue that "there is
no question that it implied a go-ahead for the military steps subsequently taken against Aideed and
his senior associates." Id.
111. HIRscH & OAKLEY, supra note 79, at 115-127.
112. Amend. No. 782 to the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-375, 108 Stat.
2658 (1993), reprinted in 139 CONG. REC. 11,127 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1993).
113. Amend. No. 790, to the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, reprinted in 139 CONG. REC.
S11,267 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993), was adopted by a vote of 90 to 7. Id. at S11,276-77.
114. The House adopted an identical amendment on September 28 by a vote of 406 to 26. 139
CONG. Rac. H7105-06 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993).
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nate funding if the President failed to make a compelling case for a
continued U.S. role.
Congress's willingness to give the President more time to make
that case evaporated immediately, however, following the tragic battle
on October 3-4, in which eighteen American soldiers were killed and
seventy-eight wounded in a raid against Aideed's forces." 5 Given the
already mounting congressional unease about the ill-defined Somalia
operation, these American casualties crystallized public and congres-
sional pressure to terminate American military involvement in Somalia.
In the face of this pressure, the President made a preemptive move: In a
speech to the nation, he narrowed the goals for American forces in
Somalia and pledged to withdraw them within six months-by the end
of March 1994.1"6 The Senate responded by adopting an amendment,
proposed by Senator Byrd, that narrowed the goals for U.S. forces even
further and ensured their withdrawal by cutting off funding as of March
31.117 The House ultimately accepted this amendment as well.' 8 Both
Houses of Congress thus finally took a joint position on Somalia,
authorizing the participation of U.S. forces in UNOSOM II for up to six
months in support of a limited humanitarian mission.
What conclusions can we draw from the congressional-executive
interactions over Somalia? In the early months of the Somalia opera-
tion, Congress and the President seemed largely to follow the Cold War
115. HIsCH & OAKLEY, supra note 79, at 127-129.
116. President's Address to the Nation on Somalia, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 2022,
2024 (1993). In his speech, the President articulated four missions for U.S. forces in Somalia.
First and foremost, U.S. forces would "protect our troops and our bases." Second, they would
"keep open and secure the roads, the port, and the lines of communication" necessary to keep food
and relief supplies "moving freely throughout the country." Third, they would "keep the pressure
on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people, not to personalize the conflict but to
prevent a return to anarchy." Fourth, they would "help to make it possible for the Somali people
.. to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve their problems and survive when
we leave." Finally, Clinton's speech signaled that the U.S. and the U.N. would revive diplomatic
and political initiatives in Somalia: "the solution to Somalia's problems is not a military one, it is
political."
117. Amend. No. 1-42, to the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, reprinted in 139 CONG. REC.
S13,516 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1993). Byrd's amendment endorsed only the first two of Clinton's
objectives for U.S. forces in Somalia. Specifically, it approved the use of U.S. forces in Somalia
to protect U.S. "personnel and bases," and to provide "assistance in securing open lines of
communication for the free flow of supplies and relief operations." Id. at S13,516. The
amendment also provided, with certain very limited exceptions, that "funds appropriated, or
otherwise made available, in this or any other Act to the Department of Defense may be obligated
for expenses incurred only through March 31, 1994, for the operations of United States Armed
Forces in Somalia." Id.
118. The House accepted the March 31 deadline only after passing an earlier nonbinding
resolution in favor of an earlier deadline of Jan. 3 1. For a discussion of these mixed signals, see
Carroll J. Doherty, House Sends Mixed Message Over Somalia Mission, CONG. Q., Nov. 13, 1993,
at 3139.
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patterns John Ely critiques in War and Responsibility. The President
deployed American forces to Somalia while Congress was out of ses-
sion. Once Congress returned, both Houses did adopt resolutions
authorizing American involvement in Operation Restore Hope; but only
the House went on to address and authorize an American military role in
the next phase of the Somalia operation. The Clinton Administration, in
the meantime, endorsed ambitious goals for UNOSOM II at the Security
Council without serious advance consultations with Congress and, later,
provided only brief reports to Congress on the subsequent combat opera-
tions against Aideed." 9 Once hostilities in Mogadishu escalated in
October 1993, however, congressional pressure forced the President
(unfortunately, belatedly) to define U.S. goals in Somalia more clearly,
and ultimately to bring American forces home. Had the Administration
and Congress consulted more intensively about the objectives of the
Somalia operation as it evolved and about the American role in it, some
of the operation's drift and confusion, and some of the American casual-
ties, probably could have been avoided.
Congress, in the end, asserted itself and used its power of the purse
(for the first time since Vietnam) to terminate U.S. military involvement
abroad.' 20 The Somalia experience also led Congress to impose a more
demanding set of reporting and consultation requirements for U.S.
involvement in future U.N. operations. 2' The President now must pro-
vide detailed monthly reports to designated congressional committees
identifying, among other things, any upcoming votes in the Security
Council to authorize or modify a U.N. peacekeeping operation, any sig-
nificant changes in U.S. participation, and the likely costs to the United
States. These reactions to the Somalia experience were just a hint of
legislative initiatives to come in the new Republican-controlled Con-
gress. In a sense, the Somalia experience was a "wake-up call" to the
United States Congress on the need to monitor more closely U.S.
involvement in U.N. military operations in the post-Cold War period.
B. Haiti
If Congress waited too long to assert a major role in the case of
Somalia, it focused on Haiti long before the President had formulated a
119. See, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in Somalia, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Docs. 1060 (June 10, 1993); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Somalia, id. at 1216 (July
1, 1993).
120. 139 CONG. Rac. S13,425 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). By exercising
its power of the purse in this way, Senator Byrd argued, Congress showed that the system of
checks and balances designed by the founders worked. Id. at S13,432.
121. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 407, 108 Stat. 448-49
(1994) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 287b-4).
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clear plan of action. Following the events in Somalia in October 1993,
Congress began to address the possibility of U.S. military involvement
in Haiti. At that time, the Security Council had authorized only a
peacekeeping mission,122 not the use of force to depose the Cedras
regime. Even so, the Somalia experience made members of Congress
aware of the risks accompanying troop deployments in situations of
internal conflict. Given congressional attitudes, moreover, the President
was reluctant to risk any American casualties. Thus, when an armed
Haitian mob gathered on October 11 to challenge the arrival of 200
American and Canadian engineers aboard the U.S.S. Harlan County, the
ship turned back. 123 At the same time, speculation that the President
might decide to deploy U.S. military forces to Haiti galvanized senate
Republicans to action.
In a war powers role reversal, Senator Robert Dole announced that
he would introduce legislation requiring the President to obtain congres-
sional authorization before using force in Haiti unless the President cer-
tified that American lives or vital national security interests were at
risk.124 When Dole ultimately decided to work with Senate Democratic
leaders to cosponsor a nonbinding provision to this effect, Senator Jesse
Helms introduced a binding amendment to the defense appropriations
bill prohibiting the use of funds for any U.S. military operations in Haiti
that were not authorized in advance by Congress, unless American citi-
zens were in imminent danger.125 Democrats and Republicans alike
argued against tying the President's hands in this way "while the situa-
tion in Haiti is still evolving and before the President has fully decided
on how he will respond to the crisis." 126 The Helms provision thus was
rejected by a vote of eighty-one to nineteen.1 27
The Senate instead adopted the nonbinding Dole-Mitchell amend-
ment to the defense appropriations bill. 128 That amendment expressed
the "sense of the Congress" that funds should not be expended for U.S.
military operations in Haiti unless authorized by Congress in advance or
unless U.S. citizens or vital national security interests were at risk, or
unless the President reported to Congress in advance of any deployment
122. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (1993).
123. Gregory Bowens, Haiti: The Next Showdown, CONG. Q., Oct. 16, 1993, at 2825.
124. Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 17, 1993).
125. Proposed Amend. No. 1072 to the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, reprinted in 139
CONG. REC. S13,978 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1993).
126. 139 CONG. REc. S14,071 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Byrd); see also id. at
S13,988-89 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Specter).
127. Id. at S14,072 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1993).
128. Id.
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of U.S. forces and made a number of specified determinations. 2 9 Inter-
estingly, Senator Byrd, who had taken the lead in asserting congres-
sional prerogatives in Somalia, was one of only two Senators to vote
against the Dole-Mitchell amendment.130 Byrd argued that
to try in advance to prohibit funds, and then to write so many waivers
into the prohibition that the President can do virtually anything he
pleases, may actually weaken the legislative branch's prerogatives,
while providing little in the way of legislative guidance or intent for
the President to consider in his role as Commander in Chief.
13 1
He was prescient. 132
During the summer of 1993, as diplomatic efforts to induce General
Cedras to comply with the Governors Island accords and relinquish
power stalemated, and as domestic criticism of Clinton's policy regard-
ing Haitian refugees intensified, the possibility that the President might
decide to intervene militarily in Haiti grew more likely. Concerned that
the President might take military action without coming to Congress for
its approval, Senator Gregg introduced an amendment to a pending
appropriations bill similar to the earlier Dole-Mitchell amendment.1
33
When Gregg decided to make his amendment legally binding, the Senate
rejected it by a vote of sixty-five to thirty-four 34 and adopted a nonbind-
ing "sense of the Congress" version instead.1 35 A few weeks later, the
Senate by a closer margin tabled a bill by Senator Dole to establish a
bipartisan congressional commission to investigate the situation in Haiti
and report within forty-five days on conditions there and on "appropriate
policy options. 1 36
Although the Senate repeatedly rejected provisions that would pro-
spectively limit the President's military or diplomatic options, Demo-
129. Id. at S14,036-37 (daily ed. Oct 20, 1993). The Dole-Mitchell provision ultimately
became § 8147 of Pub. L. No. 103-139, 107 Stat. 1474-75 (1993).
130. 139 CONG. Rc. S14,072 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1993). The other was Sen. Hatfield.
131. Id. at S14,071.
132. The Clinton Administration later invoked the Dole-Mitchell amendment to argue that the
President's unilateral deployment of U.S. combat forces to Haiti in September 1994 "accorded
with the sense of Congress," despite the fact that only a U.N. peacekeeping operation had been
authorized by the Security Council at the time the Dole-Mitchell amendment was adopted. See
Letter from Assistant U.S. Att'y Gen. Walter F. Dellinger, Office of Legal Counsel, to Sens.
Robert Dole, Alan K. Simpson, Strom Thurmond & William S. Cohen, Sept. 27, 1994, reprinted
in 89 AM. J. Nrr'L L. 122 (1995); see also Walter F. Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential
Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MiAMi L. REv. 107 (1995). For a critique of this
argument, see Letter from Bruce Ackerman et al. to President William J. Clinton (Aug. 31, 1994),
reprinted in 89 AM. J. INT'L L. at 128-129.
133. 140 CONG. Rc. S7902 (daily ed. June 29, 1994).
134. Id. at 57932. The text of the rejected Gregg amendment appears id. at S7905.
135. Id. at S7931.
136. Id. at S8980 (daily ed. July 14, 1994). The text of the Dole amendment appears id. at
S8879 (daily ed. July 13, 1994).
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crats and Republicans alike argued that the President should seek
Congress's approval before invading Haiti. 37 The war powers debate
intensified after the Security Council, at the urging of the United States,
voted on July 31, 1994 to authorize the use of force to depose the Cedras
regime and restore Haiti's lawfully-elected President Aristide to
power.'13  Three days later, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution
declaring that the Security Council's authorization did not substitute for
congressional approval. 139  Shortly thereafter, however, the Senate
tabled another effort to prevent President Clinton from committing U.S.
forces to Haiti without Congress's prior authorization, except in emer-
gency situations threatening American citizens or vital national security
interests. 14
0
Although many in Congress were unconvinced that American inter-
ests in Haiti were great enough to justify placing American forces in
harm's way, members on both sides of the aisle continued to oppose the
idea of prospectively tying the President's hands 4 1 and thereby under-
cutting his negotiating leverage with the Cedras regime.' 42  As Senator
137. E.g., 139 CONG. REc. S10,663 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Specter):
It is my view that ... as a matter of fundamental constitutional law, where the sole
authority to declare war resides in the Congress, and ... the Senate has spoken in
opposition to an invasion in Haiti, the President may not proceed on the current
record without a change in circumstances or cannot proceed when Congress is in
session and there is an opportunity for the President to come to Congress to get
authorization as the Constitution requires.
Id.; see also id. at S 10,676 (remarks of Sen. McCain) ("I believe with every bone in my body that
the President should consult with Congress, should come to Congress for authorization, and
should receive approval of any military action in Haiti."); id. at S 10,677 (remarks of Sen. Byrd)
("I believe that the President should seek prior congressional approval for any military action in
Haiti that does not stem from the urgent need to protect Americans living in Haiti or from some
other immediate national security concern.").
138. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc S/RES/940 (1994). The resolution
authorized U.N. member states, under Chapter VII of the Charter,
to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of
the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of
the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable
environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement.
Id.
139. 140 CONG. REc. S10,433 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1994). The amendment, which was
introduced by Senators Dole, Gregg, and Helms, stated: "It is the sense of the Senate that United
Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, does not constitute authorization for
the deployment of United States Armed Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the United States
or pursuant to the War Powers Resolution." Id. at S10,415.
140. This amendment, introduced by Senator Specter, appears at 140 CONG. REC. S10,663
(daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994). The vote to table the amendment was 63 to 31. Id. at S10,678.
141. E.g., id. at S10,666 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994) (remarks of Sen. McCain); id. at S10,675
(remarks of Sen. Robb).
142. E.g., id. at S10,668 (remarks of Sen. Pell); id. at S10,677 (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
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Pell put it, in order for the President to succeed in persuading the ruling
junta to depart voluntarily, "the possibility of the use of force to remove
the junta cannot be taken off the table or called into question. It is
ironic, but true, that if military action is to be avoided, the threat of it is
essential." 43
Yet as the President made clear both his determination to send U.S.
forces to Haiti and his unwillingness to seek prior congressional authori-
zation, a war powers showdown was in the making. Last-minute efforts
were launched in Congress to force a vote on the merits of a military
intervention in Haiti. 44 Although some legislators supported military
action to restore President Aristide to power, a majority of members of
Congress of both parties did not believe that the President had made a
compelling case for risking the lives of American soldiers in Haiti. 145 A
public opinion poll taken by ABC indicated that a substantial majority of
the American people opposed an invasion as well.' 46  Over three-
quarters of those surveyed also believed that the President should seek
Congress's approval before taking military action.147  Yet in both
Houses of Congress, Democratic party leaders worked to delay a vote
and avoid a likely repudiation of the President's stated policy.148
President Clinton, in the end, chose to eclipse Congress by
deploying U.S. combat forces to Haiti the weekend before a restive Con-
gress planned finally to vote on the merits of military action. Fortu-
nately, a final diplomatic effort pursued against the backdrop of an
imminent U.S. invasion secured General Cedras's agreement to relin-
quish power peacefully, and the planned combat operations were
superceded by an agreed occupation. 49 These favorable developments
moved the war powers debate to the back burner but did not extinguish
completely the anger many in Congress felt over being side-stepped by
the President.
Nevertheless, the good fortune of the Haiti operation and the avoid-
ance of combat casualties gave the President some breathing room on
143. Id. at S10,668 (remarks of Sen. Pell).
144. Representatives Skaggs, Durbin, and Boehlert cosponsored a resolution seeking a debate
and vote in the House prior to an invasion. 140 CONG. REc. H9098 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994). In
the Senate, Senators McCain and Dole attached an amendment to the nomination of a four-star
general expressing the sense of the Senate that the lives of U.S. forces "not be risked in combat for
the purpose of restoring" President Aristide to power. Id. at S12,862 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1994).
145. Doherty, supra note 8, at 2582.
146. Elaine Sciolino, Invasion of Haiti Would be Limited, Clinton Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 1994, at A13.
147. Id.
148. Doherty, supra note 8, at 2582; 140 CONG. REc. H9146 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994)
(remarks of Rep. Goss).
149. The President's News Conference With President Carter, General Powell, and Senator
Nunn on Haiti, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PEs. Docs. 1803 (Sept. 19, 1994).
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Capitol Hill. A Republican-sponsored resolution in the House calling
for an immediate withdrawal was defeated by a vote of 205 to 225.151
Also defeated was a resolution to authorize the deployment of U.S.
forces in Haiti for certain limited purposes until March 1, 1995.15 1 Both
Houses of Congress instead adopted identical resolutions declaring that
the President "should have sought" congressional approval and urging
"prompt and orderly withdrawal" from Haiti, but setting no deadline. 52
These resolutions required the President to submit a report to Congress
setting forth the "national security objectives" of the operation in Haiti,
as well as a "detailed description of United States policy, the military
mission and the general rules of engagement," and to submit monthly
reports on the status and costs of the mission.
53
Breaking ranks with the Democratic leadership, Representative Lee
Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Commmittee, criti-
cized his colleagues (and the Administration) for supporting a resolution
that neither authorized the deployment of U.S. troops to Haiti nor lim-
ited the scope of the operation.' 54 Yet to other members of Congress, a
vote to authorize the Haiti operation after the fact would simply reward
the President for acting unilaterally. 55 Congress, in the end, chose to
wait and see how events in Haiti unfolded, 156 only this time (unlike in
150. 139 CONG. REc. HI 1,099 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994). The text of this amendment, sponsored
by Representative Gilman, is set forth id. at HI 1,087-88.
151. H.R.J. Res. 416, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994), reprinted in 140 Cong. Rec. H10,972-73
(daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994). This resolution, cosponsored by Reps. Hamilton and Torricelli, was
amended, 140 CONG. REc H 1,1 12-13 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994), and ultimately defeated by a vote
of 27 to 398. Id. at HI1,121.
152. S.J.Res. 229, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. S14,346-47
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994); 140 CONG. REc. HI 1,099-00 (daily ed. Oct. 6 1994). The vote was 91 to
8 in the Senate, id. at S14,346, and 258 to 167 in the House, id. at HI 1,111-12.
153. Id. at S14,346, Hi1,100. The President signed these resolutions into law on Oct. 25,
1994.
154. 140 CONG. REc. H11,113-14 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994). Hamilton argued that "[m]embers
cannot complain about no authorization beforehand, and then duck responsibility for authorization
after the fact." Id. at HII,113.
155. E.g.,
I believe we would be making a fundamental mistake if, after the President has
decided to use force and to put troops into Haiti, for us to then retroactively
authorize that action. I think that will become a precedent for future Presidents.
And I happen to believe that the President has a responsibility to come to this
Congress and seek our approval before he puts the troops into the field.
Id. at H 11,103 (remarks of Rep. Dicks); see also id. at H10,974 (daily ed. Oct 5, 1994) (remarks
of Rep. Gilman) ("I oppose the proposal . . . because it retroactively provides congressional
authorization for the unilateral decision by the President to deploy United States Armed Forces in
the occupation of Haiti .... Congress should move instead to call for the immediate, safe, and
orderly withdrawal of United States troops from Haiti.").
156. Carroll J. Doherty, Congress, After a Sharp Debate, Gives Clinton a Free Hand, CONG.
Q., Oct. 8, 1994, at 2895.
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Somalia) Congress made sure that it would receive regular and detailed
reports on the progress of the operation.
Does the Haiti experience indicate that Congress and the President
are simply continuing their "tacit deal" in the post-Cold War period?
The President's decision to act unilaterally (despite having ample time to
build support for U.S. military action and to seek Congress's authoriza-
tion) was all too reminiscent of Cold War patterns. Did Congress's fail-
ure to vote on the merits of U.S. military involvement in Haiti before (or
even after) the President took action represent a continuing refusal to
take responsibility for decisions to commit American forces abroad, or
were other factors at work? At one level, the pattern looks awfully
familiar and one can tell an "evasion of responsibility" story to explain
what happened.
Yet the Haiti experience is more complex. Congress's failure to
vote in advance on whether to authorize (or disapprove) the use of
American force to restore the democratically-elected governent to
Haiti cannot be explained simply as a refusal to take a stand for which
the electorate might hold it accountable. After all, opinion in Congress
against the use of American force for this purpose, which seemed to be
the predominant view, was consistent with public opinion polls showing
that a majority of the American people were likewise unconvinced on
the merits. Instead, and to a greater degree, Congress's refusal to limit
the President's military options in advance reflected a widely-shared
concern that Congress should not undercut the President's ability to
engage in coercive diplomacy with the Cedras regime. In the fluid,
ever-changing world of diplomacy, Congress wanted the President to
have maximum negotiating leverage in dealing with General Cedras.
Only the President, not Congress, was institutionally capable of con-
ducting the delicate diplomacy that might, with the threat of force in the
background, yield a political resolution to the conflict. These concerns
contributed to Congress's decision to adopt "sense of the Congress" res-
olutions that urged, but did not require, the President to come to Con-
gress before taking military action. Resolutions that would have limited
funds for the use of force in Haiti (at least if certain emergency and other
conditions were not met), in contrast, repeatedly were rejected (although
the votes in favor increased somewhat as the prospect of military action
became more concrete).
Once the President made it clear that he intended to send American
troops to Haiti to depose the Cedras regime and restore President Aris-
tide to power, sentiment in Congress in favor of a vote on the merits
gained momentum. At this point, however, partisan politics combined
with presidential determination to prevent that vote from happening.
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The Democratic leaders in Congress were determined to avoid a direct
rebuff of the President's chosen policy, and they avoided taking a vote
on the eve of the invasion.157 In the end, partisan politics took prece-
dence over Congress's institutional prerogatives.
Yet the U.S. involvement in Haiti is an unfinished story, and the
new Congress is likely to have little patience if things start to go wrong.
In April 1995, the United Nations took charge of a peacekeeping opera-
tion in Haiti that followed the initial U.S.-led military operation.
Approximately 2500 U.S. forces remained in Haiti as peacekeepers
under the command of a U.S. general.1 58 As of January 1996, the U.N.
peacekeeping operation in Haiti had been quite successful. Yet by delib-
erately bypassing a largely skeptical Congress in deploying U.S. forces
to Haiti at the outset, the President throughout this operation has had a
very limited margin for error.
IV. CONCLUSION
If Somalia and Haiti are any guide, we can expect to see several
trends at work when the United States participates in U.N.-authorized
military operations in the years ahead. First, Congress will scrutinize
the objectives of future U.N. operations closely, and will demand a
detailed, ongoing account of their goals, costs, and benefits. Even if the
President acts unilaterally in deploying U.S. forces, the anticipated con-
gressional scrutiny that is sure to follow will have significant con-
straining effects. In Haiti, for example, the Clinton Administration
deliberately tailored the objectives for U.S. forces narrowly, insisted that
a U.S. general be placed in charge of the second phase of the operation,
and did a better job than in Somalia of anticipating the challenges
involved in making the transition to a U.N.-led operation. In Rwanda,
the Administration held back from making any substantial force deploy-
ment and opted for a very limited and short-term humanitarian role.
More generally, the Administration has taken a cautious stance in the
Security Council in voting for and shaping the mandate of future
peacekeeping operations.
Second, Congress will use its power of the purse more aggressively
not only to limit U.S. contributions to peacekeeping in general, but also
to limit U.S. involvement in ongoing conflicts, as in Somalia. In the
case of Rwanda, for example, Congress made sure that the President's
decision to deploy U.S. forces on a limited humanitarian mission would
not lead to another Somalia by imposing a funding cut-off and stipulat-
157. See supra note 148.
158. Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Docs. 452-53 (Mar.
21, 1995).
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ing that any change in the U.S. mission from one of strict refugee relief
to "peace-enforcing" or "nation-building" not be implemented without
the approval of Congress. 159 By virtue of its power of the purse, the
Congress ultimately cannot avoid taking a stand when American forces
are deployed in U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations.
Third, in situations involving delicate diplomacy and ongoing
efforts to resolve a conflict peacefully, as in Haiti, Congress will be
reluctant to impose binding prospective limits on the President's military
options. This reflects a well-founded concern about undermining the
President's ability to engage in coercive diplomacy in a fluid and flexi-
ble manner. If the President fails to pursue a coherent and well-articu-
lated policy, however, Congress will step in to fill the policy vacuum, as
it did toward the end of the Somalia operation.
In the end, the United States Congress, despite its newfound asser-
tiveness, will continue to look to the President to play the leading role in
shaping U.S. foreign policy goals for the post-Cold War period. Regard-
less of who is in the White House, one goal of U.S. foreign policy
should be to strengthen the United Nations as a valuable instrument for
conflict resolution. Yet because Congress is becoming more willing to
challenge the President's foreign policy choices (at least in cases that do
not involve threats to core U.S. security interests), the importance of
sharing responsibility for decisions to send U.S. forces into hostile situa-
tions in U.N.-authorized military operations is increasing.
In the years ahead, a continuation of the Cold War "tacit deal" in
the U.N. context would deprive the American people of full deliberation
by both the executive and legislative branches before American forces
are placed in harm's way. A failure to secure and sustain strong domes-
tic support for American involvement in U.N. operations also would
leave American policy especially vulnerable to sudden reversal by Con-
gress, which could undermine U.S. credibility among both our allies and
our adversaries, and erode the United Nation's ability to respond effec-
tively to the conflict at hand. Building a domestic consensus in favor of
American military involvement in U.N. operations often will not be
easy. But if Presidents choose to remain on executive-power autopilot,
they risk unleashing a congressional counterreaction that could ulti-
mately harm America's ability to maintain a posture of constructive
international engagement in the challenging times ahead.
159. Dep't of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-335, 108 Stat. 2659 (1994).
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